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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Renee Spall-Goldsmith 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs. 
WILLARD LEROY GOLDSMITH 
Respondent/ Appellant 
Appellate Case No. 20110628 
District Court Case No. 084300172 
Trial Judge: Stephen L. Henriod 
[Judge's Decisions Appealed from: 
Honorable Robert Adkins] 
Appeal from the Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
Bifurcated Decree of Divorce entered June 20, 2009 by the Honorable Robert 
Adkins 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction in the Utah Court of Appeals is proper under Utah Code Ann. 
78A-4-103(2)(h) given that the appeal is from a final judgment from the District 
Court of Utah before the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod. Judge Henriod's ruling 
was read onto the record. After Judge Henriod's retirement, the parties brought a 
dispute before the Honorable Judge Robert Adkins for interpretation. Appellant 
appeals Judge Adkins interpretation. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78B-12-102(14) states: "Joint physical custody means 
the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year and both 
parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee contends that the trial court was correct in basing child support on 
the sole custody worksheet because the parties do not meet both elements within 
the definition of joint physical custody. Appellant contends that because he meets 
one element of the definition, child support should be based upon joint physical 
custody worksheet. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
After a one day trial before the Honorable Stephen L. Henroid on July 8, 
2010, the court awarded sole physical custody to the Appellee, and granted 
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extended parent time to the Appellant. The Court further ordered that there would 
be no obligation for the Appellant to pay for any expenses of the minor child 
beyond child support, excluding work related child care and medical expenses. 
Furthermore, the Court ordered Appellant to receive a credit for any previously 
paid extracurricular activities towards his child support obligation. Appellant's 
attorney was order to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the 
Decree of Divorce. Judge Henriod retired before the dispute over which child 
support worksheet should be used, and therefore, Judge Adkins ruled after 
considering the arguments of counsel to base the child support on the sole physical 
worksheet. Appellant appeals this ruling. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The definition of joint physical custody is based upon two elements: the 
number of overnights with each parent, and how the parents share the expenses of 
the child beyond the ordered child support amount. Appellant meets the first part 
of the definition, however, the second element was directly argued and ruled upon 
at trial It was ordered that Appellant did not have to pay for expenses beyond child 
support. In fact, Appellant would receive a credit towards child support for any 
extracurricular activities he paid for. This ruling is in direct conflict with the 
second element of the definition. Given the trial court's ruling in regards to the 
payment of extracurricular activities, Appellant can't meet the second element of 
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the definition and therefore the parties do not have a joint physical custody 
arrangement. The trial court's ruling should be affirmed and the child support 
should be based upon the sole physical worksheet. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court was correct and within its power to deviate from the joint 
physical custody worksheet given that the Court did not order the Appellant to 
contribute to the expenses of the child beyond the normal child support obligation. 
Appellant erroneously relies upon only half of the definition of joint physical 
custody, and ignores the second part of the definition. Also, the Court was clear in 
its ruling that the second part of the definition, the payment of additional expenses, 
was not to be ordered. Therefore, the Court was clear that joint physical custody 
was not ordered by the Court and therefore, the joint physical custody worksheet 
should not be used in calculating child support. 
Appellant correctly relies upon Utah Code Annotated Sec. 78B-12-102(14), 
however, Appellant only focus on the first part of the definition. The legislature 
has defined joint physical custody to depend upon two elements: 
1. the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year, 
and 
2. both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying 
child support. 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Code Ann. 786-12-102(14). There is no dispute that the first element is 
satisfied based upon the parent time schedule ordered by Judge Henriod. However, 
the legislature is clear in that two requirements must be met in order for a custody 
arrangement to be deemed joint physical custody, and therefore proper use of the 
joint physical custody worksheet can be used. In the present case, Appellant 
cannot satisfy the second element. 
Clearly in his ruling, Judge Henriod excuses the Appellant from paying any 
expenses of the child beyond his child support obligation. "Any past payments for 
things like football or golf that Respondent may have paid may be counted towards 
child support." R178-185, at Paragraph 21; see also Appellant's Addendum 3: 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 21. In addition, the Court 
also stated "Football and golf are wonderful activities and are in the best-interests 
of the child. Neither parent is ordered to pay for those activity [sic]. Good parents 
will share these expenses. But there is no court Order to pay these expenses." 
R178-185, paragraph 7; see also Appellant's Addendum 3: Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, paragraph 7, page 2. Given that the minor child's 
extracurricular activities and the payment of these expenses was an issue in the 
trial court and the judge specifically dealt with these expenses in the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, this ruling is also indicative of how the parties are to 
pay for expenses of the child. The Court was clear: outside of child support, there 
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is no order that Appellant needs to pay these expenses, and furthermore, any of 
these expenses Appellant paid above and beyond child support, he shall receive a 
credit or an offset. 
Furthermore, besides child support, the legislature has stated that only two 
other expenses are parents ordered to pay: work related child care expenses and 
medical expenses. This Court has stated that "[t]his convinces us that had the 
legislature intended that parents be ordered to pay additional categories of 
expenses, such as school fees or extracurricular activities, in excess of child 
support, it would have enacted legislation to that effect. Thus, child-rearing 
expenses not statutorily distinguished from regular child support should be 
considered "part and parcel of the child support award." See Brooks, 881 P.2d at 
959 n.3., Davis v. Davis, 2011 UT App 311, f 17. Therefore, in the present case, 
the child support award is to incorporate extracurricular activities, and therefore, 
the Appellant is considered to have paid for these activities with his child support 
payments. He does not pay of expenses of the child beyond child support, and 
therefore cannot meet the definition of joint physical custody. Had the Court 
ordered that Appellant was to share in the extracurricular activities expenses, or 
had Appellant's reimbursement for these activities been denied, then Appellant 
could meet both elements of the definition. However, given the Court's orders, the 
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Appellant cannot meet the definition and therefore, use of the sole physical custody 
child support worksheet would be appropriate and in line with the Court's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant does not meet the definition of joint physical custody and 
therefore, the sole physical custody worksheet should be used to calculate child 
support. The trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
Dated: February 23, 2012 
Respectfully submitted 
By: 
)livia Uitto, Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee 
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